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Abstract 
This study attempts to determine whether there is a relationship between extreme weather 
events and crime rates. Due to the increasing effects of climate change, it is critical we 
understand the societal effects of extreme weather. Here, a panel data fixed effects 
regression was used to analyze state and year level data. It was hypothesized that there 
would be a relationship between crime and extreme events, but the results did not show a 
statistically significant relationship. Further research with increased geographic and 
temporal controls is encouraged.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Man-made climate change has been often cited as one of the greatest threats to 
our world today (World Economic Forum 2018). World leaders, nonprofit groups, and 
the majority of peer-reviewed research all argue that climate change is a concern that 
needs to be addressed and addressed soon (Cooke et. al 2013, 7). Arguably the 
consequences of allowing climate change to continue unimpeded are severe and affect 
almost every facet of life as we know it. Higher temperatures, ocean acidification, 
warming oceans, sea level rise, and an increase in frequency and severity of extreme 
weather events are only some of the threatening effects of a changing climate (Melillo 
2014, 32-101). These effects could have disastrous consequences, including forced 
migration, lowered food production, social unrest, and severe health crises. All these 
consequences can work in conjunction to threaten the livelihood of millions of people 
(IPCC, 2014). As people face food shortages, health issues, and forced migration, 
infrastructure will be overloaded, and the economy will suffer (Tol 2009, 29-51; Piguet 
2008, 10-11). 
One of the major effects of climate change is an increase in frequency and 
intensity of extreme weather events (Kundzewicz 2017, 9-10). Extreme weather can 
include avalanches, droughts, heat waves, flooding, hurricanes, and other intense and 
potentially damaging weather. Obviously, not all extreme events are tied to climate 
change, and one of the challenges facing scientists is determining the strength of the 
effect of climate change on weather events (Meehl et. al 2000, 8-9). Of all extreme 
weather events, heat waves, flooding, extreme precipitation, and droughts are the most 
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strongly linked to climate change, while tornados and hurricanes have a weaker link 
(Murray 2012, 759-760). 
The link between climate change and extreme heat is most clear, as greenhouse 
gases have the effect of causing global warming (Luber 2008, 6). In discussing this topic, 
it is important to clarify that this paper uses the word “climate” to include climatic 
variables such as temperature, rainfall, and natural disasters.  
The number of heat waves has been increasing in recent years, a trend that has 
continued in 2017 and 2018. In the 1950s, daily record high and low temperatures 
occurred with a similar frequency. In the past decade, daily record high temperatures 
occur twice as often as record lows. Scientists expect that this ratio will continue to 
increase, with record high occurring twenty times as often as record lows by 2050 
(Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2017). Extreme precipitation is also strongly 
linked to climate change, as warmer air can hold more water vapor (Center for Climate 
and Energy Solutions 2018). For each one degree increase in temperature, the air contains 
up to 7% more water vapor. With more moisture in the air, more intense precipitation is 
possible. Conversely, more intense precipitation does not necessarily lead to a total 
increase in precipitation, as models predict rain to fall less often. Along with many other 
regions of the world, the United States has seen an increase in the intensity and frequency 
of extreme precipitation events, with the Midwest and Northeast being the most strongly 
affected. Scientists are less certain about the effect of climate change on hurricanes, 
specifically whether it will lead to an increase in the number of hurricanes. However, 
scientists do expect warmer ocean temperatures and higher sea levels to intensify the 
effects of hurricanes. Recent studies of the strongest hurricanes in the past two to three 
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decades find increased intensity. Models of hurricane intensity in the United States 
Atlantic Basin predict an increase in more severe hurricanes and a reduction in less 
severe hurricanes (Knutson et. al 2013, 23-26). 
Extreme weather events have a number of negative effects. By their nature, they 
cause damage to the areas in which they occur, whether it is damage to the ecology, 
human population, or human property. Heat waves, for example, can cause an increase in 
other disasters such as drought or wildfires. Heat waves are the deadliest natural disaster 
in the United States, killing around 600 people on average per year. This is greater than 
the number killed from hurricanes, lightning, tornadoes, earthquakes, and floods 
combined (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2017). Heat waves can also damage 
agriculture, as both crops and livestock suffer from heat stress (Rosenzweig et. al 2001, 
14-15).  
Heavy precipitation can also threaten the areas it affects. Most obviously, 
flooding is likely from an extreme precipitation event, especially if it occurs after a dry 
spell. Along with flooding, extreme rain increases the chance of landslides, by raising the 
water table, saturating the ground, and causing slopes to lose stability (Center for Climate 
and Energy Solutions 2017). The runoff from rain contains pollutants like heavy metal 
and pesticides, which can end up in water systems. These pollutants can harm both 
human health and ecosystems. 
Hurricanes often cause extreme amounts of damage to the entire area they affect. 
Hurricane Katrina alone cost $125 billion in damages (Center for Climate and Energy 
Solutions 2017). The powerful winds and rain in hurricanes can cause flooding, 
destruction of property, and loss of life. The immediate effects of these events are well 
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documented, but they also have more subtle and long-term effects. Extreme weather 
events can exacerbate problems of social instability, especially if people’s homes or 
livelihoods are damaged by the event. Appropriative behavior is often an issue after 
hurricanes, as people scramble to find supplies and others take advantage of the 
overwhelmed police services (Trainor 2006). Understanding the societal effects, such as 
crime, is critical to designing policy to combat them and to adapt to them. 
Even as concern over the effects of climate change grows, some continue to argue 
that the effects are not that great, and that our immediate economic interests are of far 
greater importance1. Despite the clear scientific consensus, many still doubt either the 
existence or the negative effects of climate change (Dunlap and McCright 2010, 16-17). 
In order to properly combat climate change, it is critical that legislators act quickly to 
help mitigate human effects on the climate and help us adapt to the changing world. For 
them to get going, they must be educated on the consequences of failing to act and the 
ways in which we can improve. 
There is a long history of investigating a possible link between change in climate 
and change in level of crime. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was an influx of 
studies investigating this link. Most studies to date have focused on the effects of 
temperature and rainfall. There is a general consensus that increased temperature and 
increased rainfall are correlated with higher rates in crime and violence. However, to the 
best of my knowledge, none of these studies looks at the relationship between extreme 
weather events and crime. In addition, many of these studies use data from 20 or more 
                                                          
1 Foran, Clare. "Donald Trump and the Triumph of Climate-Change Denial." The Atlantic. December 25, 
2016. Accessed March 28, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/donald-trump-
climate-change-skeptic-denial/510359/. 
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years ago (Hsiang and Burke 2014, 6-13). This paper intends to add to the existing 
literature by investigating the effects of all extreme weather events in the most recent 
period analyzable, across the United States. Policy on crime and climate are constantly 
changing, and it is important to show that this is a relevant issue, both temporally and 
spatially. This paper will provide valuable information to policy-makers and to the 
general public, allowing them to make more robust analyses of the value of climate 
policy. 
Specifically, I investigate the relationship between nine different types of crime 
rates and the total number of extreme events over the past two decades within the United 
States. I include 47 different types of weather events from 1994-2014, 9 types of crime, 
and 3 demographic controls. Overall, I found that the relationship between extreme 
weather events and crime rates were insignificant. Even in situations where some types of 
extreme weather were significant, their values were so close to zero in magnitude their 
effect would be null. The total number of events were never significant. This may be 
because some types of events have a negative effect on crime, while others have a 
positive one. On average, the effects of total events would be averaged out. 
In Section II, I discuss the available body of research on the issue of climate 
variables, crime, and the behavioral effects of weather. In Section III, I discuss the three 
sources of data used for this paper and give descriptive analysis. In Section IV, I describe 
the empirical model for this analysis and the results it yielded. In Section V, I discuss the 
intuition and reasoning behind the results. I also describe limitations on my study and 
possible future research into the topic. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
The subject of climate and conflict received little attention in the academic 
literature until around 20 years ago. The one exception to this is the literature discussing 
the relationship between heat and aggression (Kendrick and McFarlane 1986). Data on 
temperature is much easier to gather than many other variables such as hurricanes 
tornados, and casual empiricism suggests that people become angrier at higher 
temperatures. As many of these studies note, there is a cultural linkage between 
temperature and anger, citing common phrases such as “feeling hot under the collar” and 
“temperatures flaring” (Anderson and Anderson 1984, 91). Links between temperature 
and destruction have been analyzed since the early 1900s. The earliest papers focus on 
historical analysis (Huntington 1917, 173-208), and do not use statistical analysis, but 
rather rely on historical phenomenon and draw links using logical reasoning. Even some 
recent essays focus more on discussion and linking the known effects of some 
occurrences (such as ozone depletion) to the unknown causes of other phenomenon (like 
regional violence) (Levy 1995, 23-24).  
Econometric analysis of the temperature-aggression relationship began the mid to 
late-1900s and focus on various measure of aggression such as use of car horns (Kendrick 
and MacFarlane 1986, 9-11) or domestic violence (Auliciems and DiBartolo 1995, 2-6). 
Many of these early studies use basic regression analysis to identify trends in gathered 
data. Most of the analyses look at the effect of day-to-day effects of warmer or cooler 
temperatures on specific instances of violence. In general, studies on the link between 
various kinds of rough behavior and temperature surged in the late 1900s. Several focus 
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on the link between temperature and aggression (Anderson and Anderson 1984, 91; 
Baron and Lawton 1972, 3; Anderson et al. 2000, 63-133). Others look more at more 
specific types of violence, such as assault (Cohn and Rotton 1997, 1322; Harries and 
Stadler 1983, 235-256), deadly assault (Anderson et. al. 1997), collective violence (Baron 
and Ransberger 1978, 351-360), crime rates (DeFronzo 1984, 185-210; Field 1992, 340-
351), and police officer violence (Vrij et. al 1994, 365-370). Very few of these studies 
look at the effect of cumulated extreme temperatures, instead focusing on individual 
incidents. Possibly because the field was in its infancy, many of these studies analyze 
their data in similar ways, identifying variables and running basic linear regressions. 
However, some of them stood out in terms of their analysis style. Anderson et al. (1997) 
uses latent variable analysis. These papers show an increase in interest in the subject and 
more complex analysis that reveal more subtle results. Later, Anderson et al. (2000) 
perform one of the first meta-analyses in this subject, looking at only about 10 studies, 
but using effect size calculation and categorization. This is important because it shows 
there are enough studies to determine if there is a scientific consensus on the topic. These 
early meta-analyses found a consistent link between heat and violence. 
Since the turn of the century, studies have become broader in nature, starting to 
look at the effects of climate variables on places around the world, and on a wider variety 
of types of aggression. Some studies focus on specific phenomenon, such as the El Nino 
(Davis 2001, 1368-1379; Grove 2007, 318), while others focus on general effects of 
climate change (Gleditsch 2012, 3-9 Scheffran et al. 2012). They also began focusing on 
various places during various periods of time. Some focus on early human history in 
places such as the Akkadian Empire (Cullen et al. 2000, 379-382), Mayan Civilization 
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(Haug et al. 2003, 1731-1735), and Angor, Cambodia (Buckley et al. 2010, 6748-6752), 
or simply long periods of early history (Iyigun 2017). Others focus on more modern, very 
specific locations like India (Blakeslee and Fishman 2014, Iyer 2014), Mexico (Baysan et 
al. 2014), the Philippines (Wetherley 2014), Indonesia (Caruso et al. 2014, 66-83), and 
specific regional areas of the United States (Rotton and Cohn 2000, 1074; Jacob et al. 
2007; Mares 2013, 768-783; Ranson 2014, 274-302). Still more looked at climate 
variables other than temperature, focusing on rainfall (Hidalgo et al. 2010, 505-523; 
Hendrix and Salehyan 2012, 35-50; Sarsons 2015, 62-72), water availability (Levy et al. 
2005, 21; Couttenier and Soubeyran 2014, 201-244; Maystadt and Ecker 2014, 1157-
1182; Theisen et al. 2011, 76-106), or weather shocks in general (Auffhammer et al. 
2013, 2-6; Jia 2014, 92-118). The literature does not extensively address the effects of 
natural disasters or climatic disasters on violence, with the exception of Wetherley 2014. 
Most of the literature looking at natural disasters looks at specific results of those 
disasters, such as increased temperature of cyclones (Hsiang 2010, 15367-15372), looks 
at effects other than violence, such as economic growth (Bergholt and Lujala 2012, 147-
162), or looks at very specific events (Hsiang et. al 2011). 
One paper by Matthew Ranson performs analysis similar to mine (Ranson 2014, 
274-302). Ranson estimates the effect of climate change on criminal activity in the 
United States. He found that temperature has a positive effect on all types of criminal 
behavior. Specifically, he found that the largest marginal effects were below 50 °F. His 
analysis uses the same database of criminal activity but different weather measures. 
Ranson focuses on temperature and rainfall, rather than extreme events. He also focuses 
on the county level, rather than the state or national. He does so in order to assist in 
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empirical identification of how weather affects crime rates. I choose to focus on the state 
level to make a practical examination of more weather types. Further research would 
ideally look into county-level data for my analysis. 
Despite the lack of early studies, the literature on climate and conflict has now 
grown so prolific that several meta analyses have been published, focusing on gathering 
the existing literature and either summarizing it or performing greater statistical tests on 
the broad data (Gleditsch 2012, 3-9; Hsiang et al. 2013, 1-14; Hsiang and Burke 2014, 6-
13; Burke el al. 2015, 577-617). These meta analyses gather over 50 studies on the 
subject and attempt to determine whether there is a consensus in the literature. The more 
recent meta analyses show that there is broad agreement that climate change causes 
increased rates of human conflict (Hsiang and Burke 2014, 6-13). 
 
III. Data Section 
 
I use three data sources to analyze the relationship between extreme weather 
events and crime. The first data set is from the National Centers for Environmental 
Information’s (NCEI) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The 
This NCEI receives storm data from the National Weather Service, which in turn receives 
their information from a variety of sources. These sources include county, state and 
federal emergency management officials, local law enforcement officials, skywarn 
spotters (a network of citizen dedicated to gathering weather information), NWS damage 
surveys, newspaper clipping services, the insurance industry and the general public, 
among others. The dataset tracks extreme events across the United States from 1950-
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2017. It defines the type of events it tracks as “destructive storm[s] or weather. It is 
usually applied to local, intense, often damaging storms… but it can also describe more 
widespread events.” This dataset is a collection of individual events, with a unique entry 
and id number for each (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 1950-2018). 
The dataset includes several important variables including location information, the type 
of extreme event, fatalities caused by the event, and estimated damage caused by each 
event.  
For this dataset, variation across states was high. Texas had by far the highest 20-
year average of total weather events at 3963.905. The next highest state, Kansas, was 
nearly half of that, at 2614.381. The District of Columbia, at the far end of the other 
extreme, had an average of 70.905 total events over 20 years. It must be noted, however, 
that the District of Columbia and two other states, have some years in which there are no 
recorded events. Both the District of Columbia and Alaska are missing events for 1994 
and 1995, while Hawaii is only missing events for 1994. The number of extreme events, 
collected beginning in 1950, increases drastically over time, most likely due to better 
tracking mechanisms. However, in the last couple decades, the number of reported events 
has become much more stable. Thus, the chosen time period of 1994-2014 does not have 
as much variation in observed events. Even so, the number of events more than triples 
over this period. Because this analysis looks at within-state variance, this shift should not 
affect the results. 
The unit of analysis is the state and year from 1994 to 2014. The final sample 
includes 47 types of extreme events (for example, extreme heat, flooding, hurricane, and 
blizzards). To use this data, I first dropped most of the details of the extreme events, like 
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location and damage, with the exception of the total injuries and deaths caused by the 
total extreme events in a year. I then reshaped the data so that it had a sum of each type of 
event for each state year. In this analysis, I use five weather types: heat, heavy rain, 
floods, drought, and total extreme weather events. I created the variable total events, 
simply by summing all the event types into one variable. I also created the variable total 
events to look at the effect of all the events at once. Table 1a shows the descriptive 
statistics for the weather events used in my regressions, include the mean, standard 
deviation, and the minimum and maximum. 
The second dataset is from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics which 
tracks the rate of crimes across the United States from 1960-2014 (Uniform Crime 
Reporting Statistics. 1994-2017). In particular, it tracks nine different types of crime 
rates: assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, total property crime, robbery, 
murder, rape, and total violence. All are measured in number of incidents per 100,000 
people. This data is provided by contributing law enforcement agencies, which FBI 
provides with handbook that explains how to classify and score offenses and provides 
uniform crime offense definitions. Thus, the definitions used for these crimes is the 
federal one, rather than state or local definitions. To clarify some of the crimes with 
similar colloquial usages, I will provide their definitions. Burglary is synonymous with 
breaking and entering; that is, the unlawful entry of attempted entry of a structure to 
commit a felony or theft. Robbery, on the other hand, is defined in the more colloquial 
sense as the taking or attempted taking anything of value from another person or persons 
by force or threat of force or violence and/or by putting the victim in fear. Larceny-theft 
is distinct from robbery in that the unlawful taking is not done through force, violence, or 
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fraud, e.g. shoplifting or pickpocketing. Motor vehicle theft is similar to the last two but 
applies only to motor vehicles and applies to both forceful and non-forceful takings. 
Violent crime and property crime are similar in that they are both the sum of their type of 
crime. Violence rate includes murder, assault, rape, and robbery, while property crime 
rate includes burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. 
The rate of total violent crime has a general downward trend from 1994 to 2014. 
The average rate of violent crime in 1994 is 594.24 crime per 100,000 people across the 
United States. Despite a slight increase in 2006, it decreases steadily until 2014, where 
the rate is 364.41. The overall property crime rate has a similar trend, although the rates 
are far higher than the rates of violent crime. In 1994, property crime occurs at a rate of 
4488.58. It falls steadily, almost halving in 20 years, reaching 2603.5 in 2014. There is a 
high variance in the 20-year average of crime rates across states. The District of 
Columbia has by far the highest average rate of both violent and property crime. Its 
property crime rate, at 6003.05, is more than double any other state. The effect is less 
dramatic for violent crime, where the District of Columbia’s rate of 1633.67 is only 20% 
higher than the next highest state. The states with the next highest crime rates seem to 
follow no pattern, occurring across the spectrum of size, political allegiance, and United 
States geography. The states with an average violent crime rate over 700 are, in order of 
decreasing crime rate, South Carolina, Florida, New Mexico, and Tennessee. The list is 
slightly different for property crime, with the four states with the next highest crime rates 
after D.C. being Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, and Washington. The two types of crime show 
more geographic homogeneity at low rates, with most of the states with the lowest rates 
are located on the east coast. The states with the lowest average property crime rates, just 
Tully 14 
 
over 2000, are South Dakota, North Dakota, New Hampshire, and West Virginia. Those 
with average rates of violence under 200 are Maine, Vermont, North Dakota, and New 
Hampshire. 
The data for all these crime measures was collected individually, by state and by 
year. They were then reshaped in Stata to provide a sum of that crime rate for each state 
year and merged with the weather data using the state fips. Table 1b gives the 
descriptions of these crime rates mean, standard deviations, and min and max. 
The third dataset is from the U.S. Census Bureau which includes three 
demographic variables: income, unemployment, population, and education (American 
Fact Finder. 2017). These were all gathered from the American FactFinder. 
The average population the fifty United States increases over time. In 1994, the 
average population (in 100,000s) is 5104.451, and consistently decreases to 6247.500 in 
2014. California and Texas have the highest 20-year average populations, while the 
District of Columbia and Wyoming have the lowest averages. Unemployment has a far 
less consistent trend over the 20-year period. It hovers around 4-5 from 1994-2008 and 
jumps to almost 9 in 2009. It decreases steadily from there and goes back down to near 5 
by 2014. Connecticut, California, and Arkansas have the highest 20-year average of 
unemployment, while North Dakota, Nebraska, and South Dakota have the lowest. The 
median income steadily increases over the 20-year period. The average over the United 
States started at 32,420 in 1994 and steadily increases to 55,224 in 2014. The states with 
the highest average median income over the two decades are Alaska, Connecticut, 
Maryland and New Jersey. Those with the lowest average are Arkansas, Mississippi, and 
West Virginia. 
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This dataset was treated in the same manner as the previous variables. I collapsed 
these variables into a by state year dataset covering all fifty states from 1994-2014. I then 
merged it with the other two databases by state and year. Table 1c shows the descriptive 
statistics for the demographic variables. 
 
IV. Empirical Strategy and Results 
 
I estimate a fixed effects panel model, where I regress crime in state i and year t, 
on extreme weather in state i and year t, demographic controls, state fixed effects, and 
year fixed effects. Thus, I have a separate regression for each type of crime. I include 
demographic controls in each regression: population, income, and unemployment. I also 
have a separate regression for four types of weather events, specifically ones that have 
been shown in past research to be more strongly associated with climate change. I use the 
equation: 
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  βitweatherevents + α1itincome + ⋯ + α3itPopulation + δt + γi + uit 
where crimerateit will be substituted for each of the nine types of crime rates, 
β0weather_events will be substituted with the total number of each of the five types of 
weather events. δ1 denotes fixed effects, γi denotes state fixed effects, and uit is the error 
term. Tables 4-12 show the results of each regression for each type of crime rate. Overall, 
the results fail to detect a consistent relationship between weather events and crime rates. 
Overall violent crime rates (Table 4) is not significantly affected by any of the 
types of weather events. In addition to not being significant, the effect of weather events 
does not have a consistent trend. Three of them (total events, drought, and rain) are 
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positive, while floods and heat are negative. However, these mixed trends do not have 
much of an effect, as all the weather events had coefficients very close to zero. Only rain 
events has a coefficient above 0.1, as a 1% increase in events of heavy rain is associated 
with an increase in rates of violence of around 0.163 per 100,000 people. The only 
significant variable for violence rates is population (in 100,000s), which is significant for 
every single type of weather. As population increases by 1%, rates of violence decrease 
by around 3.4 per 100,000 people. The other two demographic control variables are 
insignificant, although both have larger coefficients than any of the weather event types. 
For assault rate (Table 5), none of the types of weather are significant, and the 
coefficients remain near zero. Although insignificant, rain was again the weather event 
with the strongest correlation, correlated with a 0.14 increase in assault rates. For this 
crime type, two of the demographic controls are significant, population and 
unemployment. For all five of the weather types, as population increases, the assault rate 
decreases by around 2.5. Unemployment also appeared to decrease the assault rate for all 
of the weather types, by around 8.2. This is a surprising result, as casual empiricism 
would suggest that increasing unemployment would occur increase crime rates. Income 
was insignificant, but also strongly correlated. Although insufficient, it had a larger 
coefficient than any of the weather events, increasing assault rates by around 1.1. 
Murder rate (Table 6) was only significantly affected by one variable. The one 
significant variable was floods, which negatively affected murder by -0.0008. Given the 
smallness of this number, the effect of floods is essentially zero. Murder is distinct from 
the other crime rates in that the coefficients of every single variable were essentially zero. 
Not a single variable, including demographic controls, had a coefficient higher than 0.1. 
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The next type of crime, rape (Table 7), is notable in that it is the only crime 
significantly affected by income. Income (in 1,000s) is associated with increased crime 
rates for all weather events of around 0.26. Population is also significant, but only for 
total events, where it negatively affects crime by around 0.1. For the other event types, 
population is only significant to the 10% level. Total weather events significantly affect 
rates of rape, and two other types (rain and floods) are significant at the 10% level. 
However, all three coefficients are very close to zero. Total weather events increase 
crime by 0.002, increased rain is associated with an increase in crime of 0.019, and floods 
track with a 0.005 increase in crime. 
Robbery rates (Table 8) are not significantly affected by any of the variables. 
Both heat and drought events are significant at the 10% level. A 1% increase in drought 
is associated with a 0.017 increase in robbery rate, while heat is associated with a 0.037 
decrease. Weather types continue to have mixed effects on crime, with total events, heat, 
and floods being negative, and drought and rain being positive. Again, although 
insignificant, all of the demographic controls have larger coefficients than any of the 
weather types. Population negatively impacts robbery by 0.666, while both 
unemployment and income positively affect crime by 3.126 and 0.366, respectively. 
Property crime (Table 9) is also not found to be significantly correlated with any 
variables, either weather events or demographic controls. Rain remains the event with the 
highest coefficient, however, negatively affecting property crime by around 1.25. 
Although not significant, unemployment has an extremely high coefficient, increasing 
property crime by around 36. Population and income also have a stronger impact on 
property crime than any other the weather events, but both are negatively correlated. 
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Burglary rates (Table 10) had similar results, in that none of the variables are 
significantly correlated with burglary rates. Even the coefficients of weather events 
remain low, around zero. Again, the strongest correlation (but still insignificant) is in rain 
events, which were slightly negative, decreasing burglary rates by around 0.15. The 
coefficients of the demographic controls remain higher than those of the weather types. 
Income and population show negative correlations of around 3 and 2, respectively, and 
unemployment has a positive effect of around 7.8. 
Larceny rates (Table 11) has the first significant correlation with weather events 
with a coefficient that is not essentially zero. Rain events and flood events are both were 
significant at the 5% level, with rain decreasing larceny by around 1.3. This is still 
contrary to expectations, however, as the existing literature agrees that heavy rain is 
associated with higher rates of crime. Flood events also significantly affect larceny rates, 
but at a much lower rate. As flooding increases by 1%, rates of larceny increase by 0.17, 
which is more consistent with past analyses. None of the demographic controls are 
significant at the 5% level, but unemployment is significant at the 10% level for total 
events, rain events, and flood events. The coefficient of unemployment for these is very 
high, right around 29. Income and population were not significant, but both were negative 
with relatively low coefficients. 
Total events were the most significant in relation to motor vehicle theft (Table 
12), associated with an increase at the 1% significance level. This coefficient is still very 
close to zero, only associated with a 0.037 increase in motor vehicle theft for every 
100,000 persons when total events increase by 1%. As drought events increase by 1%, 
motor vehicle theft increases by 0.061, but only at the 10% significance level. None of 
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the demographic controls affected motor vehicle theft, and they have lower coefficients 
than for many of the crime types. Income increased crime rates by around 0.5, while 
population decreased it by around 1.6. 
Contrary to expectations and past literature, most of the crime rates were not only 
not significantly affected by weather events, but consistently had very low coefficients. 
Because almost all the coefficients were so close to zero, it was difficult to identify a 
positive or negative trend. Even in instances when weather events were significant, their 
coefficients were small enough to render the results effectively null. This trend of an 
inconsistent trend held true for the demographic controls as well, which alternately have 
negative and positive effects and lower and much higher coefficients. 
 
Robustness check 
 
I performed three tests to check for robustness in my analysis. These tests are 
intended to rule out a possible omitted variable, check the effect of time, and the 
effectiveness of a control variable. The first robustness check runs the regression with the 
demographic control variable education included. The second uses a time trend instead of 
year fixed effects, and the third runs the regression without the demographic control 
population. For all three, I re-ran the models for the two buckets of crime, violent crime 
rates and property crime rates. 
The U.S. Census Bureau data on educational attainment is only available for a subset of 
the years covered in this analysis. The existing data covers 2006-2012, which is only 7 of 
the 20 years this regression includes. Thus, it did not make sense to include this variable 
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in the entire analysis. However, education may be an important factor in explaining 
variation in crime rates. Therefore, I restrict attention to the 7 years for which I have data 
on education and re-estimate my models to see if the results are change. The measure of 
education used in this analysis is percentage of the population 25 years and over that have 
graduated from high school. When running the regression with education included, I 
found very little change for violent crime (Table 13). While population was no longer 
significant at the 5% level, it was still significant at the 10% level. None of the variable 
coefficients change much, or change sign. Education was not significant, but did have a 
strong negative coefficient, around 9.7 for all weather types. This is consistent with 
casual empiricism, which would suggest that increased education would decrease 
violence. There is a little more difference when using education in the regression for 
property crime (Table 14). When controlling for education, population becomes 
significant, negatively affecting property crime rate by around 13, almost double the 
effect when not controlling for education. Income and unemployment do not become 
significant, but their coefficients do change dramatically, to the point of changing signs. 
Education is not significant, but does have a strong negative effect on property crime 
rates of around 21.  
I also re-estimate the models excluding the demographic control population. 
Because the crime rate variables are already scaled by population, I am testing to see 
whether or not excluding them as a control impacts my results. The regression, when run 
without population, was not significantly different. The results for violent crime were 
very similar, the only major difference being that population becomes significant (Table 
15). However, the coefficient does not shift dramatically, and none of the other variables 
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change much. The results for property crime were also essentially the same (Table 16). 
None of the variables became significant, and none of their coefficients changed to a 
large degree. 
Lastly, I re-estimate the models using a time trend instead of year fixed effects. 
This explores whether assuming a linear trend (the time trend) as opposed to the time 
fixed effects changes my results. I ran two types of crime using time trend, the overall 
violent crimes rate and the overall property crimes rate. The results were not very 
different for the rate of violent crime (Table 17). The only major difference is that flood 
events are significant when run with the time trend effect, decreasing the rate of violent 
crimes by 0.072. No other variables changed in significance, and most stayed static in 
terms of coefficients. Unemployment did change in sign, from -4.823 using year fixed 
effects to 1.645 using a time trend. The results for property crime were also rather 
similar, with the only difference being that the effect of unemployment becoming 
significant (Table 18). Even with the change in significant, the coefficient of 
unemployment remained similar, moving from around 36 to around 27. Thus, it seems 
that the effects of year fixed effects and a time trend are not significantly different. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Many studies have found that increased levels of rain and heat cause an increase 
in crime rates and violence. This is a concerning trend, especially as climate change 
continues to intensify the strength and number of extreme weather events. However, 
regulation preventing climate change continues to be controversial and experts say that 
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they are insufficient to stem the effects. To institute proper regulation, cost-benefit 
analyses must include all the effects of climate change, one of which is increased 
violence from high heat and increased rain. Thus, it is important to know if whether or 
the extent to which extreme weather events are related to crime rates. If they are 
associated with higher rate of crime, the costs of climate change are even higher than 
before, and regulation is an even more pressing matter. 
 This study, however, finds little to no relationship between all extreme weather 
events and any crime types. It also fails to find links between extreme heat and crime and 
heavy rain and crime, which are consistently found to exist in existing literature. 
It is possible that this is due to the methods used in this study. Because this study 
looked at the within state variation, which is a large geographic area, it is possible that 
geographic information was left out that would have revealed nuances of the effects of 
weather on state-level crime. This analysis also looks at variation within year, which is a 
large span temporally. There may be significant other variables within each year for 
which this analysis does not account. It is also possible that there is other omitted variable 
bias that this study did not account for, as it only controlled for three demographic 
variables.  
Due to the nature of extreme weather events it is also possible that crimes would 
go unreported. For one, people would be in a high stress situation and may not have the 
time or mental space to report crimes. For another, for weather events such as floods, 
people may not know what of their belongings were lost in the weather event and what 
was stolen. These conditions may make it harder to measure the effects of extreme 
events.  
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The extensive past research on heat and rainfall has a relative consensus that high 
heat and rainfall increase crime rates. Thus, it is unlikely that, as this study shows, there 
is no effect of extreme weather on crime. Additional research should be done on this 
topic, using more detailed geographic information. It should locate the weather events on 
a county basis and include control demographic variables on county-level statistics. This 
would allow the study to control for more geographic differences that may have affected 
the results. It makes sense that looking at the state level, differences in lower-level 
geographic areas could make the results less significant. 
Following the results of past research, it is clear that more regulation of climate 
change is needed. Much of the literature shows that climate change is increasing extreme 
weather, and extreme weather increases crime. This violence, loss of human life, and 
monetary cost, should be integrated into cost-benefit analyses of regulation. Once it is, it 
will be clear that it is critical we must act to slow the effects of climate change. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of crime rates 
 
  
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Violence Rate 445.9215 265.7202 66.9 2662.6
Assault Rate 282.6109 161.3674 34.1 1441.8
Burglary Rate 732.2903 264.7023 257.2 1838.4
Larceny Rate 2420.224 687.4296 1160.8 5833.8
MV Theft Rate 344.9486 227.0699 38.9 1839.9
Murder Rate 5.625957 5.891078 0.2 73.1
Property Crime Rate 3497.463 1061.466 1524.4 9512.1
Rape Rate 34.07096 11.92828 9.7 93.3
Robbery Rate 122.5353 114.4977 6.4 1239
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of weather events 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of demographic variables 
 
  
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Total Events 844.1536 825.7011 1 5582
Drought Events 36.13445 127.3216 0 1845
Flood Events 80.58824 118.138 0 1345
Heat Events 17.26127 44.44825 0 432
Rain Events 13.04507 26.55835 0 400
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Population (in 100000s) 57.07355 63.78452 4.74982 387
Income (in 1000s) 44.71272 9.608257 23.564 76.165
Unemployment 5.63615 1.924597 2.3 13.65833
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Table 4: Effect of Weather Events on Violence Rates 
  
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. One, two, or three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-
percent levels, respectively. 
Violent Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total Events 0.0063753
0.0141654
# Drought 0.0362929
Events 0.0257264
# Heat Events -0.0284155
0.0798465
# Rain Events 0.1626216
0.1357977
# Flood Events -0.0375565
0.0302868
Income 1.670024 1.690005 1.627125 1.671362 1.597386
3.184576 3.204764 3.204391 3.187211 3.202578
Population -3.211704** -3.415674** -3.183361** -3.2722** -3.190398 **
1.465661 1.486354 1.47692 1.494989 1.473439
Unemp -4.823267 -4.4237 -4.783009 -4.740565 -4.764791
5.232743 5.208266 5.248325 5.16253 5.239642
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Table 5: Effect of Weather Events on Assault Rates 
  
Assault Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total Events 0.008
(0.010)
# Drought 0.017
Events (0.018)
# Heat Events 0.004
(0.058)
# Rain Events 0.141
(0.099)
# Flood Events -0.026
(0.021)
Income 1.115 1.095 1.071 1.102 1.044
(2.246) (2.265) (2.263) (2.251) (2.260)
Population -2.408** -2.477** -2.370** -2.448** -2.376**
(0.914) (0.954) (0.937) (0.953) (0.934)
Unemp -8.259** -8.064** -8.242** -8.181** -8.209**
(3.653) (3.639) (3.667) (3.597) (3.650)
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Table 6: Effect of Weather Events on Murder Rates 
  
 
Murder Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total Events 3.33E-06
3.04E-04
# Drought -3.23E-04
Events 3.82E-04
# Heat Events -0.001
0.001
# Rain Events -3.21E-04
0.003
# Flood Events -7.75E-4**
3.57E-04
Income -0.095 -0.096 -0.096 -0.095 -0.096
0.161 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.162
Population 1.08E-04 0.002 7.15E-05 3.01E-04 -4.90E-05
0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
Unemp -0.094 -0.098 -0.093 -0.094 -0.093
0.159 0.159 0.159 0.158 0.158
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Table 7: Effect of Weather Events on Rape Rates 
  
Rape Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total Events 0.002**
0.001
# Drought 0.002
Events 0.001
# Heat Events 0.006
0.005
# Rain Events 0.0185*
0.010
# Flood Events 0.0047*
0.002
Income 0.274** 0.265** 0.264** 0.267** 0.267**
0.126 0.125 0.125 0.123 0.126
Population -0.131** -0.132* -0.121* -0.129*  -.120*
0.065 0.070 0.069 0.069 0.068
Unemp 0.317 0.340 0.316 0.329 0.316
0.418 0.436 0.429 0.423 0.428
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Table 8: Effect of Weather Events on Robbery Rates 
  
Robbery Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total Events -0.004
0.005
# Drought 0.0173*
Events 0.010
# Heat Events -0.037*
0.022
# Rain Events 0.002
0.045
# Flood Events -0.016
0.012
Income 0.366 0.413 0.377 0.387 0.371
0.896 0.893 0.895 0.894 0.894
Population -0.666 -0.795 -0.685 -0.684 -0.687
0.537 0.513 0.516 0.518 0.516
Unemp 3.216 3.390 3.239 3.208 3.225
2.134 2.114 2.134 2.131 2.130
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Table 9: Effect of Weather Events on Property Crime Rates 
  
Property Crime 
Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total Events 0.104
0.066
# Drought 0.028
Events 0.138
# Heat Events 0.305
0.386
# Rain Events -1.243
0.885
# Flood Events 0.226*
0.120
Income -2.047 -2.584 -2.550 -2.911 -2.406
9.707 9.808 9.795 9.844 9.858
Population -6.774 -6.473 -6.277 -5.602 -6.241
6.273 7.130 6.530 6.132 6.516
Unemp 36.259 36.818 36.257 36.008 36.263
23.481 23.932 23.904 23.930 23.763
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Table 10: Effect of Weather Events on Burglary Rates 
   
Burglary rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total Events 0.025
(0.016)
# Drought 0.012
Events (0.042)
# Heat Events 0.076
(0.103)
# Rain Events -0.157
(0.199)
# Flood Events 0.044
(0.038)
Income -2.449 -2.569 -2.568 -2.623 -2.544
(2.803) (2.829) (2.824) (2.826) (2.832)
Population -1.651 -1.615 -1.532 -1.449 -1.526
(1.714) (1.947) (1.777) (1.707) (1.777)
Unemp 7.725 7.918 7.722 7.723 7.737
(6.100) (6.096) (6.114) (6.126) (6.112)
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Table 11: Effect of Weather Events on Larceny Rates 
  
Larceny Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total Events 0.042
0.046
# Drought -0.045
Events 0.079
# Heat Events 0.133
0.262
# Rain Events -1.332**
0.573
# Flood Events 0.177**
0.081
Income -0.236 -0.539 -0.437 -0.774 -0.297
(5.789) (5.823) (5.820) (5.807) (5.859)
Population -3.485 -3.002 -3.284 -2.552 -3.251
(3.762) (4.248) (3.846) (3.466) (3.833)
Unemp 29.171* 28.803 29.162 28.729* 29.076*
(17.338) (17.412) (17.431) (16.954) (17.291)
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Table 12: Effect of Weather Events on Motor Vehicle Theft Rates 
  
MV Theft Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total Events 0.037***
(0.013)
# Drought 0.061*
Events (0.031)
# Heat Events 0.096
(0.065)
# Rain Events 0.245
(0.193)
# Flood Events 0.005
(0.027)
Income 0.628 0.513 0.445 0.476 0.425
(3.991) (4.055) (4.049) (4.023) (4.063)
Population -1.639 -1.856 -1.462 -1.602 -1.465
(1.214) (1.332) (1.319) (1.340) (1.319)
Unemp -0.499 0.233 -0.488 -0.306 -0.411
(8.284) (8.544) (8.531) (8.409) (8.549)
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Appendix 
Table 13: Effect of Weather Events on Violent Crime Controlling for Education 
 
Violent Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total Events -0.006
0.005
# Drought -0.001
Events 0.011
# Heat Events -0.007
0.040
# Rain Events 0.017
0.102
# Flood Events -0.006
0.013
Income 1.455 1.410 1.416 1.402 1.403
1.744 1.741 1.741 1.740 1.736
Population -2.704* -2.805* -2.829* -2.841* -2.883*
1.466 1.549 1.502 1.438 1.540
Unemp -5.432 -5.363 -5.349 -5.367 -5.300
3.984 3.995 3.998 3.989 4.001
Education -9.574 -9.831 -9.780 -9.897 -9.847
6.459 6.555 6.512 6.644 6.547
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Table 14: Effect of Weather Events on Property Crime Controlling for Education
  
Property Crime 
Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total Events -0.006
0.031
# Drought -0.030
Events 0.076
# Heat Events -0.128
0.140
# Rain Events 0.084
0.591
# Flood Events 0.048
0.069
Income 11.593 11.602 11.615 11.514 11.599
7.059 7.125 7.068 7.114 7.124
Population -12.816** -12.289** -13.006** -13.029** -12.421**
5.321 5.641 5.270 5.373 5.456
Unemp -2.568 -2.667 -2.405 -2.539 -2.975
28.575 28.519 28.450 28.514 28.516
Education -21.058 -21.207 -20.800 -21.618 -21.202
37.632 37.847 37.809 37.189 37.844
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Table 15: Effect of Weather Events Not Controlling for Population 
 
  
Violent Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total Events 0.001
0.015
# Drought -0.016
Events 0.023
# Heat Events -0.025
0.076
# Rain Events 0.070
0.196
# Flood Events -0.034
0.032
Income 1.605 1.575 1.591 1.613 1.564
3.118 3.137 3.137 3.125 3.136
Unemp -7.047 -7.136 -7.019 -7.038 -7.006
5.363 5.339 5.346 5.294 5.341
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Table 16: Effect of Weather Events Not Controlling for Population 
 
Property 
Crime Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total Events 0.093
0.068
# Drought -0.071
Events 0.105
# Heat Events 0.311
0.384
# Rain Events -1.403
0.985
# Flood Events 0.232*
0.121
Income -2.184 -2.803 -2.621 -3.010 -2.471
9.694 9.788 9.787 9.839 9.853
Unemp 31.568 31.677 31.848 32.074 31.878
23.380 23.774 23.677 23.725 23.489
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Table 17: Effect of Weather Events on Violence Rate with Time trend 
  
  
Violent Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total -0.009
Events 0.012
# Drought 0.035
Events 0.022
# Heat -0.120*
Events 0.067
# Rain 0.121
Events 0.136
# Flood -0.072**
Events 0.032
Income 1.327 1.410 1.310 1.363 1.317
2.979 2.971 2.969 2.954 2.972
Population -3.372** -3.643** -3.426** -3.487** -3.429**
1.554 1.495 1.513 1.532 1.508
Unemp 1.645 2.035 1.977 1.874 1.729
2.959 3.039 3.092 3.028 3.058
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Table 18: Effect of Weather Events on Property Crime Rate with Time trend 
 
  
Property Crime 
Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Total Events 0.057
0.051
# Drought 0.050
Events 0.125
# Heat Events -0.128
0.324
# Rain Events -1.257
0.876
# Flood Events 0.160
0.104
Income -6.575 -6.489 -6.623 -6.937 -6.570
9.154 9.160 9.162 9.164 9.190
Population -7.030 -7.030 -6.720 -6.040 -6.700
6.370 6.960 6.500 6.100 6.480
Unemp 28.441*** 27.901*** 27.754** 26.639** 27.676***
10.221 10.247 10.529 10.262 10.367
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